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Abstract
This paper develops a framework for analyzing the impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit
risk and dynamic capital structure choice. We begin by observing that when cash ﬂows depend on
current economic conditions, there will be a beneﬁt for ﬁrms to adapt their default and ﬁnancing policies
to the position of the economy in the business cycle phase. We then demonstrate that this simple
observation has a wide range of empirical implications for corporations. Notably, we show that our
model can replicate observed debt levels and the countercyclicality of leverage ratios. We also
demonstrate that it can reproduce the observed term structure of credit spreads and generate strictly
positive credit spreads for debt contracts with very short maturities. Finally, we characterize the impact
of macroeconomic conditions on the pace and size of capital structure changes, and debt capacity.
r 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), economists have devoted much effort to
understanding ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing policies. While most of the early literature analyzes
ﬁnancing decisions within qualitative models, recent research tries to provide quantitative
guidance as well.
1 However, despite the substantial development of this literature, little
attention has been paid to the effects of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and
capital structure choices. This is relatively surprising since economic intuition suggests that
the economy’s business cycle phase should be an important determinant of default risk,
and thus, of ﬁnancing decisions. For example, we know that during recessions, consumers
are likely to cut back on luxuries, and thus ﬁrms in the consumer durable goods sector
should see their credit risk increase. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that
macroeconomic conditions impact the probability of default (see Fama, 1986; Dufﬁe and
Singleton, 2003, pp. 45–47). Yet, existing models of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing policies typically
ignore this dimension.
In this paper we contend that macroeconomic conditions should have a large impact not
only on credit risk but also on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. Indeed, if one determines optimal
leverage by balancing the tax beneﬁt of debt and bankruptcy costs, then both the beneﬁt
and the cost of debt should depend on macroeconomic conditions. The tax beneﬁt of debt
obviously depends on the level of cash ﬂows, which in turn should depend on whether the
economy is in an expansion or in a contraction. In addition, expected bankruptcy costs
depend on the probability of default and the loss given default, both of which should
depend on the current state of the economy. As a result, variations in macroeconomic
conditions should induce variations in optimal leverage.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a ﬁrst step towards understanding the
quantitative impact of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk and capital structure
decisions. To do so, we develop a contingent claims model in which the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows
depend on both an idiosyncratic shock and an aggregate shock that reﬂects the state of the
economy. The analysis is developed within a standard model of capital structure decisions
in the spirit of Mello and Parsons (1992). Speciﬁcally, we consider a ﬁrm that has exclusive
access to a project that yields a stochastic stream of cash ﬂows. The ﬁrm is levered because
debt allows it to shield part of its income from taxation. However, leverage is limited
because debt ﬁnancing increases the likelihood of costly ﬁnancial distress. Once debt has
been issued, shareholders have the option to default on their obligations. Based on this
endogenous modeling of default, the paper derives valuation formulas for coupon-bearing
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1Since the seminal papers by Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976) and Brennan and Scwhartz (1978), the
literature on the valuation of corporate securities and ﬁnancing decisions has substantially developed. Mello and
Parsons (1992) and Leland (1994) endogenize shareholders’ default decision and determine optimal capital
structure. Fischer et al. (1989), Leland (1998), and Goldstein et al. (2001) model dynamic ﬁnancing decisions. Fan
and Sundaresan (2000), David (2001), Franc -ois and Morellec (2004), and Hege and Mella-Barral (2005) analyze
the effects of strategic default. Morellec (2001) analyzes the impact of asset liquidity on leverage and the structure
of debt contracts. Fries et al. (1997), Lambrecht (2001), and Miao (2005) investigate the interaction between
capital structure and product market competition. Cadenillas et al. (2004), and Morellec (2004) examine the role
of manager-stockholder conﬂicts in explaining debt levels. Dufﬁe and Lando (2001) incorporate imperfect
information and learning. Hackbarth (2004), Hennessy (2004), and Childs et al. (2005) investigate the impact of
ﬁnancing policy on investment policy. Bhanot and Mello (2006) examine rating triggers.
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expressions to analyze credit risk and determine optimal leverage.
The analysis shows that, when the value of the aggregate shock shifts between different
states (boom or recession), the shareholders’ default policy is characterized by a different
default threshold for each state. Under this policy the state space can be partitioned into
various domains including a continuation region in which no default occurs. Outside of this
region, default can occur either because cash ﬂows reach the default threshold in a given
state or because of a change in the state of the aggregate shock. In other words, aggregate
shocks generate some time-series variation in the present value of future cash ﬂows to
current cash ﬂows that may induce the ﬁrm to default following a change in
macroeconomic conditions. The paper also demonstrates that while variations
in idiosyncratic shocks are unlikely to explain the clustering of exit decisions observed
in many markets, changes in macroeconomic conditions provide the basis for such
phenomena.
Following the analysis of the shareholders’ default policy, we examine the implications
of the model for ﬁnancing decisions. The leverage ratios that the model generates are in
line with those observed in practice. In addition, the model predicts that leverage is
countercyclical, consistent with the evidence reported by Korajczyk and Levy (2003).W e
also examine dynamic capital structure choice and relate both the pace and the size of
capital structure changes to macroeconomic conditions.
2 In particular, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms
should adjust their capital structure more often and by smaller amounts in booms than in
recessions. Another quantity of interest for corporations is the credit spread on corporate
debt. We show that the model can generate a term structure of credit spreads that is in line
with empirically observed credit spreads on corporate debt and strictly positive credit
spreads for short term debt issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a static model of
capital structure decisions in which ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows depend on macroeconomic
conditions. Section 3 determines the prices of corporate securities. Section 4 discusses
implications. Section 5 examines dynamic capital structure choice. Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Assumptions
We construct a partial equilibrium model of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. Throughout the
paper, agents are risk neutral and discount cash ﬂows at a constant interest rate r.
3 Time is
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2The study by Drobetz and Wanzenried (2004) provides early empirical support for this hypothesis.
3Throughout the analysis, the risk free rate r is constant and, as a result, does not move with macroeconomic
conditions. This is supported by the weak historical correlation (presumably due to adjustments in monetary
policy) between ﬂuctuations in real GDP or ﬂuctuations in real consumption and the rate of return on risk-free
debt. More speciﬁcally, over the period 1959:3 to 1998:4, the correlation between the quarterly growth rate on real
consumption per capita (source: NIPA on non durables and services) and the three-month T-bill rate on the
secondary market is -0.0031. Over that same period, the correlation between the quarterly growth rate on GDP
and the three-month T-bill rate on the secondary market is 0.0561. In addition, Campbell (1999) reports that the
‘‘the annualized standard deviation of the ex post real returns on U.S. Treasury bills is 1.8% and much of this is
due to short-term inﬂation risk. [...] Thus, the standard deviation of the ex ante real interest rate is considerably
smaller.’’
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consider an inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrm with assets that generate a continuous stream of cash ﬂows.
Management acts in the best interests of shareholders. Corporate taxes are paid at a rate t
on operating cash ﬂows, and full offsets of corporate losses are allowed. At any time t, the
ﬁrm’s instantaneous operating proﬁt (EBIT) satisﬁes:
fðxt;ytÞ¼xtyt, (1)
where ðytÞtX0 is an aggregate shock that reﬂects the state of the economy, and ðxtÞtX0 is an
idiosyncratic shock that reﬂects the ﬁrm-level productivity uncertainty.
4 We presume that
ðxtÞtX0 is independent of ðytÞtX0 and evolves according to the geometric Brownian motion:
dxt ¼ mxt dt þ sxt dWt; x040 given, (2)
where mor and s40 are constant parameters and ðWtÞtX0 is a standard Brownian motion
deﬁned on ðO;F;PÞ. Both x and y are observable to all agents.
Because the ﬁrm pays taxes on corporate income, it has an incentive to issue debt.
Following Leland (1998), we consider ﬁnite-maturity debt structures in a stationary
environment. The ﬁrm has debt with constant principal p and paying a constant total
coupon c at each moment in time. It instantaneously rolls over a fraction m of its total
debt. That is, the ﬁrm continuously retires outstanding debt principal at a rate mp (except
when bankruptcy occurs), and replaces it with new debt vintages of identical coupon,
principal, and seniority. Therefore, any ﬁnite-maturity debt policy is completely
characterized by the tuple ðc;m;pÞ. In the absence of bankruptcy, the average debt
maturity T equals 1=m.
Economically, our ﬁnite-maturity debt assumption corresponds to commonly used
sinking fund provisions (e.g., Smith and Warner, 1979). Mathematically, this modeling
approach is equivalent to debt amortization being simply an exponential function of time.
Since the total coupon rate and the sinking fund requirement are ﬁxed, we obtain a time-
homogeneous setting akin to Leland (1998), Dufﬁe and Lando (2001), and Morellec
(2001). We further assume that the debt coupon is initially determined such that debt value
equals principal value. That is, debt is issued at par.
5 Proceeds from the debt issue are paid
out as a cash distribution to shareholders at the time of ﬂotation.
Once debt has been issued, shareholders’ only decision is to select the default policy that
maximizes equity value. We presume that if the ﬁrm defaults on its debt obligations, it is
immediately liquidated. In the event of default, the liquidation value of the ﬁrm is aAðxtÞ,
where a 2ð 0;1Þ is a regime-dependent recovery rate on assets and AðxtÞ is the value of
unlevered assets. Section 5 extends the basic model to incorporate dynamic capital
structure choice. In this more general setting, shareholders have to decide on the initial
amount of debt to issue as well as the optimal default and restructuring policies.
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4Suppose that the ﬁrm’s production function is Yt ¼ AtN
g
t; where Yt is output, At is the ﬁrm-level productivity
shock, Nt is labor, and g 2ð 0;1Þ represents returns to scale. Let the inverse demand function be given by
pt ¼ htY
 1=e
t , where ht represents the aggregate demand shock and e40 is the elasticity of demand. Then the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by f t ¼ maxNt ptYt   wtNt, where wt is the wage rate, which is assumed to be constant.
Solving yields f t ¼ y






t with y ¼ gðe   1Þ=e. Letting yt ¼ y







t , we obtain f t ¼ xtyt as in Eq. (1).
5This assumption implies that the tax beneﬁts of debt only hinge upon the chosen debt coupon and hence do not
depend on whether debt is initially ﬂoated at a discount or premium to principal value.
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Before proceeding to the analysis, it might be helpful to brieﬂy contrast the present
model with some related lines of research.
Contingent claims analysis. As in previous contingent claims models, we analyze equity
in a levered ﬁrm as an option on the ﬁrm’s assets and model the decision to default as a
stopping problem. The distinguishing feature of our model is that the current cash ﬂow
depends on current macroeconomic conditions (expansion or contraction). Because the
decision to default balances the present value of cash ﬂows in continuation with the present
value of cash ﬂows in default, this implies that the decision to default also depends on
current macroeconomic conditions. This feature is unique to our model and cannot be
reproduced by introducing discontinuities through a jump-diffusion model.
Regime shifts and ﬁrms’ policy choices. Recent work by Guo et al. (GMM, 2005)
investigates the impact of discrete changes in the growth rate and volatility of cash ﬂows on
ﬁrms’ investment decisions. One important point of departure from GMM is that we
introduce regime shifts in the aggregate shock only and the aggregate shock inﬂuences cash
ﬂows multiplicatively. Another important difference is that GMM analyze real investment
whereas we examine capital structure decisions. Finally, from a technical point of view,
GMM solve a control problem in which control policies change the underlying diffusion
process whereas we solve a stopping problem.
3. Valuation of corporate securities
In this section, we derive the values of corporate debt and equity as well as the default
thresholds selected by shareholders. These results will be used below to analyze credit risk
and capital structure decisions. To examine the impact of macroeconomic conditions on
these quantities in the simplest possible environment, we assume that the aggregate shock
ðytÞtX0 can only take two values: yL and yH with yH4yL40. In addition, we presume that
yt is observable and that its transition probability follows a Poisson law, such that ðytÞtX0 is
a two-state Markov chain. Let li40 denote the rate of leaving state i and ‘i denote the
time to leave state i. Within the present model, the exponential law holds:
Pð‘i4tÞ¼e lit; i ¼ H;L, (3)
and there is a probability liDt that the value of the shock ðytÞtX0 changes from yi to yj
during an inﬁnitesimal time interval Dt. In addition, the expected duration of regime L is
ðlLÞ
 1 and the average fraction of time spent in that regime is lHðlL þ lHÞ
 1.
3.1. Finite-maturity debt value
We start by determining the value of corporate debt. Debt value equals the sum of the
present value of the cash ﬂows that accrue to debtholders until the default time and the
change in this present value that arises in default. Since the latter component depends on
the ﬁrm’s abandonment value, we start by deriving this value.
3.1.1. Abandonment value
We follow Mello and Parsons (1992) and Leland (1994) by presuming that the
abandonment value of the ﬁrm equals the value of unlevered assets, i.e., the unlimited
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Denoting by EP½ j   the conditional expectation operator associated with P, we can thus




e rtð1   tÞxt yt dt
       x0 ¼ x;y0 ¼ yi
  
; i ¼ L;H. (4)
Since the level of the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows depend on the current regime, so does the
ﬁrm’s abandonment value. Applying Ito ˆ ’s lemma and simplifying, we ﬁnd that AiðxÞ














HðxÞþlH½ALðxÞ AHðxÞ  þ ð1   tÞxyH. ð6Þ
Within the current framework, the expected rate of return on corporate securities is r.
Thus, the left-hand side of these equations reﬂects the required rate of return for holding
the asset per unit of time. The right-hand side is the expected change in the asset value (i.e.,
the realized rate of return). These expressions are similar to those derived in standard
contingent claims models. However, they contain the additional term li½AjðxÞ AiðxÞ ,
which reﬂects the impact of the aggregate shock on the value functions. This term is the
product of the instantaneous probability of a regime shift and the change in the value
function occurring after a regime shift.








yields the following expression for the ﬁrm’s abandonment value:




r   m
 
lHðyH   yLÞ




r   m
þ
lLðyH   yLÞ
ðr   mÞðr   m þ lL þ lHÞ
. ð10Þ
In the above two expressions, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the abandonment
value of the ﬁrm in the absence of regime shifts. The second term adjusts this abandonment
value to reﬂect the possibility of a regime shift (thereby attenuating implied changes).
3.1.2. Debt value
Consider next the value of corporate debt. Denote by d
0
i ðx;c;m;p;tÞ the date t value
of debt issued at time 0. These original debtholders receive a total payment rate of
e mtðc þ mpÞ as long as the ﬁrm is solvent. Now deﬁne the value of total outstanding debt
at any date t by diðx;c;m;pÞ¼emt d
0
i ðx;c;m;p;tÞ. Because diðx;c;m;pÞ receives a constant
payment rate c þ mp, it is independent of t.
Let x 
i denote the default threshold that maximizes equity value in regime i ¼ H;L.
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be shown that the total value of outstanding debt solves the following system of ODEs (the
arguments for the debt structure c;m; and p are omitted):










HðxÞþlH½aLALðxÞ dHðxÞ  þ c þ mp.
(11)

















HðxÞþlH½dLðxÞ dHðxÞ  þ c þ mp. ð13Þ
As is the case for the abandonment value, these equations are similar to those obtained
in the standard diffusion case (e.g., Leland, 1998), and they incorporate an additional term
that reﬂects the impact of the possibility of a change in the value of the aggregate shock on
asset prices. This term equals lH½aLALðxÞ dHðxÞ  in Eq. (11), where aL is the recovery
rate in a recession, since it will be optimal for shareholders to default subsequent to a
change of yt from yH to yL on the interval ½x 
H;x 
L . (See Section 3.3.2 for a discussion.)

























where derivatives are taken with respect to x. The value-matching (14)–(15) impose an equality
between the value of corporate debt and the value of cash ﬂows accruing to debtholders in
default. Because the decision to default does not belong to bondholders, these value-matching
conditions are not associated with additional optimality conditions. In addition, because cash
ﬂows to claimholders are given by a (piecewise) continuous Borel-bounded function, the debt
value functions dið Þ are piecewise C2 (see Theorem 4.9, pp. 271 in Karatzas and Shreve, 1991).
Therefore, the value function dHð Þ is C0 and C1 and satisﬁes the continuity and smoothness
(16)–(17). Solving Eqs. (12)–(17), we obtain the following proposition, where, for notational
convenience, we identify ﬁnite-maturity debt parameters by bars (e.g., x or T).
Proposition 1. When the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows are given by Eq. (1) and it has issued
ﬁnite-maturity debt with coupon payment c, instantaneous debt retirement rate m, and total
principal p, the value of corporate debt in regime i ¼ L;H is given by
dLðx;c;m;pÞ¼
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Cxb1 þ Dxb2 þ lH
ð1   tÞaLKLx
r   m þ m þ lH
þ
c þ mp




aHð1   tÞKHx; xpx 
H;
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
(19)
where the endogenous default thresholds x 
L and x 
H are reported in Proposition 4,
the parameters KL and KH are given in Eqs. (9)–(10), the exponents g, x, b1, and b2 are
deﬁned by
x ¼ 0:5   m=s2  
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð0:5   m=s2Þ
2 þ 2ðr þ mÞ=s2
q
, ð20Þ
g ¼ 0:5   m=s2  
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð0:5   m=s2Þ
2 þ 2ðr þ m þ lL þ lHÞ=s2
q
, ð21Þ
b1 ¼ 0:5   m=s2 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
ð0:5   m=s2Þ
2 þ 2ðr þ m þ lHÞ=s2
q
, ð22Þ
b2 ¼ 0:5   m=s2  
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
ð0:5   m=s2Þ
2 þ 2ðr þ m þ lHÞ=s2
q
, ð23Þ
the constants A, B, C, and D satisfy
A ¼







½w4 þ xw1   b1w2ðx 
L=x 
HÞ




w5w8   w6w7
,
C ¼








½w4 þ xw1   b1w2ðx 
L=x 
HÞ




w5w8   w6w7
, ð24Þ
and












r þ lH þ m
;





r þ lH þ m
; w4 ¼  lH
ð1   tÞaLKLx 
L
r   m þ m þ lH
;
w5 ¼ð lL þ lHÞðx 
LÞ
g; w6 ¼ð x 
LÞ






   b1
;
w7 ¼ð xlL þ glHÞðx 
LÞ
g; w8 ¼ b2ðx 
LÞ






   b1
:
(25)
Proposition 1 provides the value of corporate debt when cash ﬂows from assets in place
depend on the realizations of both an idiosyncratic shock and an aggregate shock. The
ARTICLE IN PRESS
D. Hackbarth et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006) 519–550 526value of corporate debt is equal to the sum of the value of a perpetual entitlement to the
current debt service ﬂow and the change in value that occurs either after a sudden change
in the value of the aggregate shock or when the idiosyncratic shock smoothly reaches a
default boundary x 
i . In these valuation formulas, the default threshold is determined by
shareholders and hence is an exogenous parameter for bondholders.
Proposition 1 shows that the value of corporate debt in the continuation region ½x 
L;1Þ
has three components. First, it incorporates the value of a perpetual claim to the stream of
risk-free coupon and debt retirement payments. Second, it reﬂects the change in value
arising when the idiosyncratic shock reaches the default boundary x 
L from above for the
ﬁrst time; i.e., debtholders’ recoveries. Third, it captures the change in default risk that
occurs following a change in the value of the aggregate shock. The value of corporate debt
in the transient region ½x 
H;x 
L  also has three components. First, it includes the value of a
perpetual claim to the stream of non defaultable debt payments, ðc þ mpÞ=ðr þ lH þ mÞ.
Because the rate of leaving state i ¼ H is lH, the discount rate is increased by lH to reﬂect
the possibility of a change in the value of the aggregate shock. Second, it reﬂects the change
in debt value that arises when the value of the idiosyncratic shock either reaches the
default boundary x 
H the ﬁrst time from above or the upper boundary of that region x 
L
from below. Third, it captures the change in value that arises when default occurs suddenly




We now turn to the value of the levered ﬁrm. Total ﬁrm value equals the sum of the
unlimited liability value of a perpetual claim to the current ﬂow of after-tax operating income,
plus the present value of a perpetual claim to the current ﬂow of tax beneﬁts of debt, minus
the change in those present values arising in default. Thus, the levered ﬁrm value viðxÞ satisﬁes
the following system of ODEs (the argument for the coupon c is omitted):













HðxÞþlH½vLðxÞ vHðxÞ  þ ð1   tÞxyH þ tc. ð27Þ








HðxÞþlH½aLALðxÞ vHðxÞ  þ ð1   tÞxyH þ tc. (28)
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and abandonment value at the time of default. Again, Eqs. (31)–(32) are continuity and
smoothness conditions. Using Eqs. (26)–(32), we obtain the next result.
Proposition 2. When the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows are given by Eq. (1), the value of the
levered ﬁrm in regime i ¼ L;H is given by
vLðx;cÞ¼


















Cxb1 þ Dxb2 þ lH
ð1   tÞaLKLx
r   m þ lH
þ
ð1   tÞyHx







aHð1   tÞKHx; xpx 
H;
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(34)
where the endogenous default thresholds x 
L and x 
H are reported in Proposition 4, the
parameters KL and KH are given in Eqs. (9)–(10), the exponents g, x, b1, and b2 are deﬁned
as in Eqs. (20)–(23) with m ¼ 0, and the constants A, B, C, and D satisfy
A ¼







½w4 þ xw1   b1w2ðx 
L=x 
HÞ




w5w8   w6w7
,
C ¼







½w4 þ xw1   b1w2ðx 
L=x 
HÞ




w5w8   w6w7
, ð35Þ
where




; w2 ¼ð 1   tÞ aHKH  
yH þ lHaLKL












; w4 ¼ð 1   tÞ KH  
yH þ lHaLKL




w5 ¼ð lL þ lHÞðx 
LÞ
g; w6 ¼ð x 
LÞ






   b1
,
w7 ¼ð xlL þ glHÞðx 
LÞ
g; w8 ¼ b2ðx 
LÞ






   b1
. ð36Þ
The expressions reported in Proposition 2 for the levered ﬁrm value are similar to those
provided for the value of corporate debt (Proposition 1) and, thus, admit a similar
interpretation. Total ﬁrm value is equal to the sum of the value of a perpetual entitlement
to the current ﬂow of income and the change in value that occurs either after a change in
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i .
As was the case for the value of corporate debt, the default threshold is chosen solely by
shareholders and hence is an exogenous parameter for ﬁrm value.
3.3. Equity value and default policy
Because the values of corporate securities depend on the default threshold selected by
shareholders, we now turn to the valuation of equity. Based on the closed-form solution
for equity value, we will derive the equity value-maximizing default policy.
3.3.1. Equity value
In the absence of arbitrage, levered ﬁrm value equals the sum of the debt and equity
values. Formally, við Þ   dið Þ þ eið Þ for i ¼ L;H. This simple observation permits the
following result.
Proposition 3. When the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows are given by Eq. (1) and the ﬁrm has
issued ﬁnite-maturity debt with contractual coupon payment c, instantaneous debt retirement
rate m, and total principal p, the value of equity in regime i ¼ L;H is given by
eLðx;c;m;pÞ¼








vHðx;cÞ dHðx;c;m;pÞ; xXx 
L;









where the endogenous default thresholds x 
L and x 
H are reported in Proposition 4 and dið Þ
and við Þ in regime i ¼ L;H are given in Propositions 1 and 2, respectively.
The expressions in Proposition 3 for the value of equity are similar to those for ﬁrm
value (Proposition 2) and, thus, admit a similar interpretation. Since debt and ﬁrm value
functions individually satisfy the appropriate value-matching conditions in Eqs. (14)–(15)
and Eqs. (29)–(30), equity value, or við Þ   dið Þ, also satisﬁes the corresponding value-
matching conditions. Likewise, because the debt and ﬁrm value functions are derived
based upon the appropriate continuity and smoothness conditions in Eqs. (16)–(17) and
Eqs. (31)–(32),), equity value satisﬁes boundary conditions of this type too. Given the
abandonment value function of the ﬁrm, equity value equals zero in case of both smooth
and sudden default when the absolute priority rule is enforced (see Morellec, 2001). The
main difference between ﬁrm (or debt) and equity is that the default threshold is
determined by shareholders and, hence, only depends on equity value.
3.3.2. Default policy
Once debt has been issued, the shareholders’ only decision in the static model is to select
the default policy that maximizes the value of equity. Within our model, markets are
frictionless and default is triggered by shareholders’ decision to optimally cease injecting
funds in the ﬁrm (see also Leland, 1998; Dufﬁe and Lando, 2001; Morellec, 2004).
Formally, an equity value-maximizing default policy in our framework is associated with
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where derivatives are taken with respect to x. The smooth-pasting (39) and (40) ensure that
default occurs along the optimal path by requiring a continuity of the slopes at the
endogenous default thresholds x 
L and x 
H. By combining the results from Propositions 1–3
with equity holders’ optimality conditions in (39)–(40), we obtain closed-form expressions
for the endogenous default thresholds reported in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. When the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows are given by Eq. (1), the default policy
that maximizes equity value in regime i ¼ L;H is given by a trigger-strategy x 
i . That is, if
there exist non negative solutions to the following non linear equations
w1x   w1x þð 1   tÞKl x 
L ¼ lL½ðg   xÞBðx 
LÞ
g  ð g   xÞBðx 
LÞ
g , ð41Þ
w2b1   w2b1 þ
ð1   tÞyH
r   m þ lH
x 
H ¼ð b1   b2ÞDðx 
HÞ
b2  ð b1   b2ÞDðx 
HÞ
b2, ð42Þ
where w1;w1;w2;w2;B;D;B; and D are given in Eqs. (27)–(28) and Eqs. (41)–(42), then the
equity value-maximizing default policy is characterized by the default thresholds x 
L   Rx 
H
and x 
H that solve the above two equations.
As in standard contingent claims models, the default policy that maximizes equity value
balances the present value of the cash ﬂows that shareholders receive in continuation with
the cash ﬂow that they receive in liquidation. The present value of a perpetual entitlement
to the (pre-tax) cash ﬂows to shareholders in state i and at time t is given by
Kix  ð c þ mpÞ=ðr þ mÞ. Therefore, for a given debt policy ðc;m;pÞ, the default threshold
should decrease with those parameters that increase Ki. At the same time, the decision to
default should be hastened by larger opportunity costs of remaining active. Hence the
default thresholds increase with the debt coupon c and the debt principal p, and decrease
with average debt maturity T ¼ 1=m.
To better understand the mechanics of default, consider the case of inﬁnite maturity debt
where m ¼ 0. In this case, the equity value-maximizing default threshold is linearly
increasing in the debt service ﬂow c in each regime i (see Appendix B). This default policy
implies that it is possible to represent, for each regime i, the no-default and default regions
as in Fig. 1a. In the no-default region ½x 
i ;1Þ, the value of waiting to default exceeds the
default payoff and it is optimal for shareholders to inject funds into the ﬁrm. In the default
region ð0;x 
i  , the default payoff exceeds the present value of cash ﬂows in continuation
and hence it is optimal for shareholders to default.
The region ½x 
H;x 
L , where default occurs if the value of the aggregate shock changes
from yH to yL, can then be represented as in Fig. 1b. This ﬁgure reveals that while the
optimal default policy corresponds to a trigger policy when the economy is in a boom, this
is not the case when it is in a contraction. In this second state, there are two ways to trigger
default. First, the value of the idiosyncratic shock can decrease to the default threshold x 
L.
This is the default policy that is described in standard models of the levered ﬁrm. Second,
there can be a change in the value of the aggregate shock from yH to yL while the value of
the idiosyncratic shock belongs to the region ½x 
H;x 
L . We show below that these two ways
to trigger default have different implications at the aggregate level.
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4.1. Calibration of parameters
This section examines the empirical predictions of the model for the decision to default,
value-maximizing ﬁnancing policies, and credit spreads on corporate debt. To determine
asset prices and capital structure decisions, we need to select parameter values for the
initial value of the ﬁrm’s assets x0, the risk free interest rate r, the tax advantage of debt t,
the recovery rate ai, the volatility of the ﬁrm’s income s, the growth rate of cash ﬂows m,
and the persistence in regimes lL and lH. In what follows, we select parameter values that
roughly reﬂect a typical S&P 500 ﬁrm. Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices.
Consider ﬁrst the parameters governing operating cash ﬂows. We set the initial value of
these cash ﬂows to x0 ¼ 1. While this value is arbitrary, we show below that neither
optimal leverage ratios nor credit spreads at optimal leverage depend on this parameter.
The risk free rate is taken from the yield curve on Treasury bonds. The growth rate of cash
ﬂows has been selected to generate a payout ratio consistent with observed payout ratios.
The ﬁrm’s payout ratio reﬂects the sum of the payments to both bondholders and
shareholders. Following Huang and Huang (2002), we take the weighted averages between
the average dividend yields (4% according to Ibbotson and Associates) and the average
historical coupon rate (close to 9%), with weights given by the median leverage ratio of
S&P 500 ﬁrms (approximately 20%). In our model, the ﬁrm’s payout ratio in regime i is
given by ðð1   tÞxyi þ tciÞ=viðx;ciÞ, where ci is the coupon payment in regime i. In the base
case, the predicted payout is 2.35% in regime L and 6.85% in regime H. Weighting those
values by the fraction of the time spent in each regime gives an average payout ratio of:
0:4   2:35 þ 0:6   6:85 ¼ 5:05%. Similarly, the value of the volatility parameter is chosen
to match the (leverage-adjusted) asset return volatility of an average S&P 500 ﬁrm’s equity
return volatility.
The tax advantage of debt captures corporate and personal taxes and is set equal to
t ¼ 0:15. Liquidation costs (in percentage) are deﬁned as the ﬁrm’s going concern value

















Fig. 1. Optimal default policy. (a) Represents the equity value-maximizing default policy for m ¼ 0 in each regime
i as a function of c. This default policy requires the ﬁrm to default on its debt obligations the ﬁrst time xt reaches
x 
i . (b) Represents the impact of a change in macroeconomic conditions on the value-maximizing default policy.
There exists a region for the state variable x for which a shift from the expansion regime to the contraction regime
triggers default.
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respectively report liquidation costs equal to 36.5% and 45.5% for the median ﬁrm in their
samples. We simply take the average, which is about 40%. This asset recovery rate implies
an expected recovery rate of 50% on debt principal, which is close to the historical average
reported by Hamilton et al. (2003).
The maturity of corporate debt is chosen to reﬂect the average maturity of corporate
bonds as reported by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996). Thus, we
take T ¼ 5 in our base case. The persistence parameter values reﬂect the fact that
expansions are of longer duration than recessions. Importantly, the relative increase in the
present value of future cash ﬂows following a shift from the contraction regime to the




ðr   mÞðyH   yLÞ
lLyH þ lHyL þð r   mÞyL
¼ 20%. (43)
Thus, our base case environment calls for reasonable variations of policy choices across
regimes. In addition, these input parameter values imply a ratio of the default rate in a
recession versus a boom between 5 and 7.5, which is consistent with US historical data as
reported by Altman and Brady (2001).
Finally, we have reported formulas for asset prices, given a coupon c and a principal
value p. When debt is ﬁrst issued, there is an additional constraint relating the market
value of corporate debt to its principal: for a given degree of leverage, the coupon c is set so
that market value dið Þ equals principal value p in regime i ¼ L;H.
4.2. The decision to default
We start by analyzing shareholders’ default decision. As we show in Section 3, when the
default decision is endogenous, the default threshold selected by shareholders depends on
the parameters determining the ﬁrm’s environment and there exists one default threshold
per regime. Moreover, default thresholds are countercyclical, leading to higher default
rates in recessions. In particular, we show in the Appendix that, when m ¼ 0, we can write









risk free interest rate r ¼ 0:055
initial level of cash ﬂow x0 ¼ 1
growth rate of cash ﬂows m ¼ 0:005
volatility of cash ﬂows s ¼ 0:25
tax advantage of debt t ¼ 0:15
recovery rate on assets aH ¼ aL ¼ 0:6
persistence of shocks lL ¼ 0:15, lH ¼ 0:1
average debt maturity T ¼ 5 ðm ¼ 0:2Þ










These equations reveal that shareholders default on the ﬁrm’s debt obligations when the
present value of future cash ﬂows equals the adjusted opportunity cost of remaining active.
The adjustment is made through the factor G, which represents the option value of waiting
to default. A similar argument applies to the default decision in the recession regime.
Another interesting feature of the optimal default policy is that, because of the
possibility of a regime shift, the default thresholds x 
L and x 
H are related to one another.
Speciﬁcally, the equity value-maximizing default strategy is characterized by a different
default threshold in each regime. Moreover, because of the possibility of a regime shift,
each default threshold takes into account the optimal default threshold in the other regime.
This functional dependence is captured by the ratio R of the two default thresholds. Two
factors are essential in determining the magnitude of this ratio: (1) the ratio of cash ﬂows in
the expansion versus contraction regimes yH=yL, and (2) the persistence in regimes lL and
lH. In particular, the ratio of the two default thresholds increases with yH=yL. In addition,
because the persistence in regimes represents the opportunity cost of defaulting in one
regime versus the other, an increase in li reduces the opportunity cost of defaulting in
regime i, and hence narrows the gap between the default thresholds in the two regimes.
This effect is illustrated by Fig. 2, which plots the ratio of the two default thresholds as a
function of the persistence parameter in the contraction regime L.
Importantly, the two default thresholds x 
L and x 
H exceed the default threshold
associated with a one-regime model that would be calibrated during an expansion (i.e.with
lH ¼ 0 and yt ¼ yH for all tX0).
6 This feature of the model is represented in Fig. 3, which
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Fig. 2. Default thresholds ratio. It plots the ratio R ¼ x 
L=x 
H, which relates the default thresholds in the two
regimes as a function of the persistence of cash ﬂows in the contraction regime lL. Input parameter values are set
as in the base case environment and debt is initially issued in the expansion regime. In addition, we presume that
the coupon level is c ¼ 0:2 and that lL 2½ 0:1;0:7 .
6This follows from the following arguments. Let eHðx;cÞ denote equity value for the one-regime model with
yt ¼ yH for all t: Then, equation When the ﬁrm’s operating cash ﬂows are given by Eq. (45) implies that
eiðx;cÞoeHðx;cÞ; i ¼ H;L: Thus, the value matching condition implies that 0 ¼ eiðx 
i ;cÞoeHðx 
i ;cÞ: Since eHðx;cÞ
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probability of default is increasing in the default threshold, Fig. 3 implies that the two-regime
model is associated with estimates of the probability of default that are (1) higher than those
associated with the one regime model calibrated in a boom and (2) lower than those associated
with the one regime model calibrated in a recession. This ﬁnding has several important
implications for ﬁnancial institutions. First, as noted by Allen and Saunders (2002), previous
‘‘models’ overly optimistic estimates of default risk during boom times reinforces the natural
tendency of banks to overlend just at the point in the business cycle that the central bank
prefers restraint.’’ Our model shows that by recognizing the impact of macroeconomic cycles,
a simple two-regime model can help mitigate this effect. Second, because credit risk models
also determine the amount of reserves of capital a bank should hold (and hence the amount of
capital a bank can allocate to the real side of the economy), our model should also mitigate the
cyclical cash constraint effects that show up in the lending process by reducing the estimates of
the probability of default when the economy is in a recession.
While some of the above arguments are familiar from the contingent claims literature,
the present model delivers a richer set of default policies than do traditional contingent
claims models. Notably, when the aggregate shock can shift between discrete states at
random times, default by ﬁrms in a common market or industry can arise simultaneously
(see also Giesecke, 2002; Driessen, 2005; Cremers et al., 2005). This clustering of defaults
will happen when the idiosyncratic shock of several ﬁrms belongs to the transient region
and the aggregate shock shifts from yH to yL (thereby triggering an immediate default of
these ﬁrms). Importantly, in the standard model with a single risk factor, a clustering of
defaults is unlikely to occur with the sequential exercise of options to default, unless ﬁrms
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Fig. 3. Default thresholds in the two- vs. one-regime models. It plots the two default thresholds that obtain in
our model as well as the default threshold x 
exp that would obtain in a standard model calibrated in the expansion
regime as a function of the coupon payment. The short-dashed line, the long-dashed line, and the solid line,
respectively, represent x 
L, x 
H, and x 
exp. Input parameter values are set as in the base case environment. The
coupon payment varies between zero and one.
(footnote continued)
is increasing in x; it follows that the default threshold for the one regime model with yt ¼ yH must be lower than
x 
i : Similarly, one can show that the default threshold for the one regime model with yt ¼ yL is higher than x 
i :
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aggregate risk factor could also be used to model joint defaults. In our model the aggregate
risk factor can only take two values, and hence implies a common systemic jump to
default.
4.3. Optimal leverage and debt capacity





; i ¼ L;H. (46)
While default policy is selected by shareholders to maximize equity after the issuance of
corporate debt (and hence maximizes eið Þ), debt policy maximizes eið Þ plus the proceeds
from the debt issue, i.e. við Þ   eið Þ þ dið Þ for i ¼ L;H. Because ﬁrm value depends on the
current regime, the selected coupon rate and leverage ratio also depend on the current
regime. The coupon rate selected by shareholders is the solution to the problem:
maxc viðx;cÞ. Denote the solution to this problem by c 
i ðxÞ. We assume that this solution is
unique and verify this conjecture in the simulations. Optimal leverage then equals
L 
i ðx;m;pÞ Liðx;c 
i ðxÞ;m;pÞ. In the simulations below we compute optimal leverage
assuming that the recovery rate does not depend on the regime.
In the base case environment, the value-maximizing leverage ratio is equal to 19.72% in
a recession and 16.61% in a boom. Thus, within our model, leverage is countercyclical.
This feature of the model is consistent with the evidence reported by Korajczyk and Levy
(2003). The countercyclical nature of leverage results from two countervailing effects.
First, regime shifts affect the ﬁrm’s default risk. Second, regime shifts change the present
value of future cash ﬂows. In particular, the coupon rate, which determines the book value
of debt, in the expansion regime exceeds the coupon rate in the contraction regime,
reﬂecting the additional debt capacity associated with a lower default risk. At the same
time, however, the present value of future cash ﬂows is greater in the expansion regime,
increasing the denominator of Eq. (46). In our model, the second effect always dominates
the ﬁrst, generating the countercyclicality in leverage.
7 Importantly, the fact that the
coupon is regime dependent alleviates somewhat the difference between default thresholds
and debt capacities in booms versus recessions (see below).
Because ﬁrm value depends on the various dimensions of the ﬁrm’s environment, so does
the leverage ratio selected by shareholders. Consider, for example, the impact of volatility
on the ﬁrm value-maximizing leverage ratio. In contingent claims models of the levered
ﬁrm, the volatility parameter provides a measure of bankruptcy risk. This in turn implies
that this parameter affects both expected bankruptcy costs and the tax advantage of debt –
the greater volatility, the shorter the time period over which the ﬁrm beneﬁts from the tax
shield. Since optimal capital structure reﬂects a trade-off between these two quantities
(recall that in our model investment policy is ﬁxed), optimal leverage depends crucially on
the level of the volatility parameter. In particular, an increase in volatility typically raises
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technically challenging, to extend our regime-switching model to procyclical variations in interest rates.
Inutitively, a procyclical interest rate process should attenuate the present value effect.
D. Hackbarth et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006) 519–550 535default risk and hence reduces the value-maximizing debt ratio. Table 2 provides
comparative statics that show the impact of volatility on the quantities of interest.
Data in Table 2 and Fig. 4 reveal that the selected coupon rate and leverage ratio are
very sensitive to the values of the volatility parameter. For example, as volatility increases
from 20% to 30%, optimal leverage in the expansion regime decreases from 21.03%
to 13.24%.
Consider next the impact of persistence in regimes on ﬁnancing decisions. Numerical
results in Table 2 indicate that the persistence in regimes is an important determinant of
value-maximizing ﬁnancing policies. For example, as lL, an indicator of the non-
persistence of regime L, increases from 0.1 to 0.2, it is optimal for shareholders to increase
the optimal coupon payment in regime L by 21% (from 0.1064 to 0.1289). Data in Table 2
and Fig. 4 also reveal that an increase in li decreases optimal leverage since ﬁrm value itself
depends on persistence in regimes. Because of the very nature of the model, a change in li
affects quantities in both regimes. Maturity also has a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁnancing
decisions. In our model, a reduction in the maturity of the debt contract implies an increase
in the debt service and thus an increase in the probability of default. The optimal response
for the ﬁrm is to issue less debt. Simulation results reported in Table 2 show for example
that as the average debt maturity T decreases from seven to three years, the ﬁrm optimally
reduces its leverage ratio from 19.8% to 12.8% in the expansion regime. Finally, and as
illustrated by Fig. 4, other standard comparative statics apply within our model, so we do
not report them.
An alternative expression for the variations in debt policy that may arise because of
changes in macroeconomic conditions relates to their impact on the ﬁrm’s debt capacity. In
this paper, we deﬁne debt capacity as the maximum amount of debt that can be sold
against the ﬁrm’s assets. Arguably, if default clusters can arise in a recession, the expected
recovery rate on the ﬁrm’s assets is likely to be lower than the expected recovery rate in a
boom since the industry peers are likely to be experiencing problems themselves (see
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) for a theoretical argument and Acharya et al. (2003) for
evidence). Thus, we report in Fig. 5 the debt capacity of the ﬁrm for different recovery
rates in a recession. Because default risk is lower in an expansion than in a contraction, the
debt capacity of the ﬁrm is greater when the economy is in an expansion. In the base case
environment for example, the maximum value of corporate debt that could be sold in a
boom is 15% larger than the maximum value that could be sold in a contraction. As the
recovery rate in the contraction regime decreases, this difference between regimes increases
and exceeds 40% when aL ¼ 0:2.
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Table 2
Contraction Regime Expansion Regime
coupon leverage coupon leverage
Base 0.1196 19.72 0.1206 16.61
s ¼ 0:20 0.1513 24.97 0.1523 21.03
s ¼ 0:30 0.0958 15.70 0.0967 13.24
lL ¼ 0:10 0.1064 19.91 0.1082 15.98
lL ¼ 0:20 0.1289 19.57 0.1295 17.02
T ¼ 3 0.0910 15.31 0.0913 12.83
T ¼ 7 0.1453 23.39 0.1473 19.83
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Fig. 4. Optimal leverage ratios. It plots the optimal leverage ratio of the ﬁrm as a function of: (1) the growth rate
of cash ﬂows m; (2) the volatility of cash ﬂows s; (3) the persistence of recessions lL; and (4) the recovery rate aH.
The solid line represents optimal leverage in a boom and the dashed line optimal leverage in a recession. (a)
Leverage and growth rate. (b) Leverage and volatility. (c) Leverage and persistence. (d) Leverage and recovery
rate.
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Fig. 5. Debt capacity. It plots the ratio of the debt capacity in a boom to the debt capacity in a contraction as a
function of the recovery rate in the contraction regime. Debt capacity is deﬁned as the maximum amount of debt
that the ﬁrm can ﬂoat.
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We now turn to the analysis of credit spreads on corporate debt. Credit spreads on




  r. (47)
Fig. 6 examines the credit spread on newly issued debt as a function of average debt
maturity T, for alternative leverage ratios when the recovery rate does not depend on the
regime. For highly levered ﬁrms, credit spreads are high, but decrease as the average debt
maturity T increases beyond one year. For medium-to-high leverage ratios, credit spreads
are hump-shaped. That is, intermediate-term debt promises higher yields than either short-
or long-term corporate debt. Credit spreads of low leverage ﬁrms are low, but increase with
maturity T.
In contrast to previous contingent claims models, our framework can produce non
trivial credit spreads for short-term corporate debt issues (see also Dufﬁe and Lando, 2001;
Zhou, 2001). In the base case environment, credit spreads are relatively close to zero for
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Fig. 6. Term structure of credit spreads. (a) and (b) plot the term structure credit spreads on corporate debt. The
ﬁve lines represent credit spreads resulting from leverage ratios of 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, and 70% in a boom. We
use the same debt structure ðc;m;pÞ to compute spreads in a recession. (a) Term structure of credit spreads in a
boom. (b) Term structure of credit spreads in a recession.
D. Hackbarth et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006) 519–550 538short-term debt when the economy is in a boom. However, in a recession very short-term
credit spreads taper off at around 20–200 basis points in case of medium to high leverage.
As a result, the slope of the term structure is steeper at the short end in booms than in
recessions. This result obtains because with regime shifts investors are always more
uncertain about the nearness of default. The ﬁgure also reveals that in a recession, credit
spreads on debt exceed those prevailing during a boom by up to 150 basis points.
Let us now turn to analyzing the determinants of credit spreads. Consider ﬁrst volatility.
Fig. 7 indicates that credit spreads increase with the volatility of cash ﬂows from assets in
place. Within the present model, volatility has two effects on credit spreads. First, for a
given coupon payment, the probability of default and, hence the cost of debt, increases
with the volatility parameter s. Second, because the cost of debt increases with s, the
optimal response for shareholders typically is to issue less debt. Numerical results indicate
that the ﬁrst effect dominates, so that credit spreads increase with volatility.
Consider next the growth rate of cash ﬂows. Again, the impact of this parameter on
credit spreads at optimal leverage results from two opposite effects. First, for a given
coupon payment, the default threshold selected by shareholders decreases with m and so do
expected bankruptcy costs. Second, because the cost of debt decreases with m, it is optimal
for shareholders to issue more debt. Numerical results reported in Fig. 7 indicate that the
ﬁrst effect dominates so that credit spreads decrease with the growth rate of cash ﬂows.
Numerical results also reveal that, because lower recovery rates imply a lower leverage
ARTICLE IN PRESS























































Fig. 7. Credit spreads. It plots credit spreads on corporate debt for a leverage of 40% as a function of: (1) the
growth rate of cash ﬂows m; (2) the volatility of cash ﬂows s; (3) the persistence of recessions lL; and (4) the
recovery rate aL. Input parameter values are set as in the base case environment: (a) Credit spreads and growth
rate. (b) Credit spreads and volatility. (c) Credit spreads and persistence. (d) Credit spreads and recovery rate.
D. Hackbarth et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006) 519–550 539level, credit spreads at optimal leverage levels increase when recovery rates decrease.
(Obviously, for any given debt level credit spreads increase with liquidation costs.) Other
standard comparative statics apply. Thus we do not report them.
5. Dynamic capital structure
In this section, we extend the basic model to allow for dynamic capital structure choice.
To simplify the analysis, we presume throughout the section that m ¼ 0. In addition, we
follow Fries et al. (1997) and Goldstein et al. (2001) by considering that the ﬁrm can only
adjust its capital structure upwards.





H, such that the ﬁrm increases its coupon payment once
operating cash ﬂows reach yixU
i in regime i. We also assume that whenever the ﬁrm issues
debt, it incurs a proportional ﬂotation cost i.
The scaling feature underlying our model permits the adoption of the dynamic capital
structure formulation developed by Leland (1998) and Goldstein et al. (2001). To see this,
observe that when m ¼ 0, the default thresholds x 
H and x 
L are linear in c. In addition, the
optimal coupon rates c 
H and c 
L are also linear in x.
9 This implies that if two ﬁrms A and B
are identical except that their initial values of idiosyncratic shocks differ by a factor
xB
0 ¼ rixA
0 in regime i ¼ H;L, then the optimal coupon rate in regime i, cB
i ¼ ricA
i , the
optimal default threshold, x B
i ¼ rix A
i , and every claim in regime i will be larger by the
same factor ri. For the dynamic model, the scaling feature implies that since at the time of
a restructuring the value of the idiosyncratic shock in regime i; xU1
i ¼ rix0; is a factor ri







i , and all claims in regime i will scale upward by the factor ri.
We now use this scaling property of the model to solve for optimal dynamic capital
structure. In our model ﬁrm value is equal to the value of unlevered assets plus the tax
beneﬁt of debt minus bankruptcy and ﬂotation costs. Thus, we can write the value of the
ﬁrm in regime i as:
viðx;cÞ¼AiðxÞþTBiðx;cÞ BCiðx;cÞ ð ICiðx;cÞþiPiÞ, (48)
where TBiðx;cÞ is the total tax beneﬁt in regime i, BCiðx;cÞ are the total expected
bankruptcy costs in regime i, iPi are the initial ﬂotation costs in regime i, and ICiðx;cÞ is
the present value of the ﬂotation costs paid by the ﬁrm when restructuring its capital
structure. Similarly, we can write the value of equity in regime i as eiðx;cÞ 
viðx;cÞ Diðx;cÞ, where Diðx;cÞ is the value of debt in regime i. The default threshold
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of Leland (1998). As discussed in Goldstein et al. (2001), while in theory management can both increase and
decrease future debt levels, Gilson (1997) ﬁnds that transaction costs discourage debt reductions outside of
Chapter 11. In addition, the fact that equity prices tend to trend upwards makes the option to issue additional
debt more valuable than the option to repurchase outstanding debt. Finally, in this model (as in Leland, 1998),
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inﬁnite maturity debt, i.e., to set m ¼ 0.
9This follows from the following arguments. Eqs. (B.3)–(B.6) in the Appendix imply that A ¼ c1 xA0; B ¼
c1 gB0;C ¼ c1 b1C0;D ¼ c1 b2D0; where A0;B0;C0; and D0 are independent of c. Thus, Eqs. (B.1)–(B.2) imply that
eH and eL are homogeneous of degree one in x and c: Similarly, debt values dH and dL are homogeneous of degree
one in x and c. This in turn implies that ﬁrm value has this homogeneity property in regime i ¼ H;L: Therefore,
the optimal coupon rate in regime i is linear in x:




where derivatives are taken with respect to x. Shareholders’ objective is then to choose
ci;ri ¼ xU
i =x0 to maximize ﬁrm value subject to the above smooth-pasting condition and
the requirement that debt is issued at par. That is, we allow the ﬁrm to choose different
ﬁnancing and restructuring strategies depending on the prevailing regime.
We report in Table 3 numerical results that rely on the solution presented in Appendix C
when the value of the aggregate shock is yH (i.e., the expansion regime). As in Section 4,
similar results with lower coupon payments and higher leverage ratios obtain in the
contraction regime. Table 3 illustrates the following features of the dynamic model.
First, the possibility to adjust capital structure dynamically increases ﬁrm value and the
associated gain decreases with the magnitude of ﬂotation costs, as suggested by economic
intuition. While the potential gain reported in Table 3 is low, this essentially results from a
low tax beneﬁt of debt in our base case environment. As the tax beneﬁt of debt increases,
the potential increase in ﬁrm value rises. For example, when the marginal corporate tax
rate is 35% and ﬂotation costs are 1%, the value of the unlevered ﬁrm is 9.8, the value of a
levered ﬁrm following a static capital structure policy is 11.15, and the value of a levered
ﬁrm following a dynamic capital structure policy is 11.73. Thus, the possibility of issuing
debt increases ﬁrm value by 14% in the static model and by 20% in the dynamic model,
compared with an unlevered ﬁrm.
A second interesting feature of the results reported in Table 3 is that the default
thresholds in the dynamic model are always lower than the default thresholds in the static
model. This feature results from two separate effects. First, the debt policy of the ﬁrm is
more conservative in the dynamic model and thus the opportunity cost of remaining active
is lower. Second, because of the options to increase leverage in the future, ﬁrm value is
more valuable and it is thus optimal for shareholders to postpone the decision to default.
The third interesting feature of the data reported in Table 3 is that, consistent with
economic intuition, the restructuring thresholds increase with ﬂotation costs. In addition,
because the tax advantage of debt is greater when yt ¼ yH than when yt ¼ yL, the
restructuring thresholds satisfy xU
HoxU
L. This result has several implications. First, it
implies that ﬁrms should adjust their capital structure more often in booms than in
recessions since the expected time between restructurings is decreasing with the value of the
restructuring threshold. Second, it also implies that, holding investment policy ﬁxed, ﬁrms
should adjust their capital structure by smaller amounts in booms than in recessions.
10
Indeed, suppose that the ﬁrm makes its initial ﬁnancing decision when the economy is in an
expansion and selects the coupon level c0
H. Then, if the process x ﬁrst reaches xU
H in a
boom, the ﬁrm raises debt so that its new coupon is c1
H ¼ c0
HxU
H=x0. If the process x ﬁrst
reaches xU




H. If the ﬁrm is in a recession regime when making its ﬁrst ﬁnancing
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test of this hypothesis on a sample of 90 Swiss ﬁrms over the 1991–2001 period. Basing their tests on the dynamic
panel data estimator suggested by Arrelano and Bond (1991), Drobetz and Wanzenried demonstrate that the
speed of adjustment toward optimal capital structure depends on the stage of the business cycle. In particular,
they demonstrate using popular business cycle variables that the speed of adjustment to the target is faster when
economic prospects are better.
D. Hackbarth et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2006) 519–550 541decision, then the ﬁrm issues an initial debt contract with a smaller coupon c0
L and the
above argument goes through with c0
L replacing c0
H.
Finally, it should be noted that the ﬁrm’s optimal leverage ratio is lower in the dynamic
model than in the static model. This is due to the fact that we only consider the possibility
of increasing leverage in the future (a similar point is made in Goldstein et al., 2001). When
both upward and downward leverage adjustments are allowed, the leverage ratio in the
dynamic model is closer to that of the static model. It should also be noted that in the
dynamic model leverage increases with ﬂotation costs while in the static model leverage
decreases with ﬂotation costs. The latter effect results from the greater costs of issuing debt
that reduces optimal leverage in the static model. The former effect is due to the fact that as
adjustment costs increase, the optimality (and likelihood) of future changes in leverage
decreases. Thus, the optimal response for the ﬁrm is to issue an amount of debt that is
closer to that of the static case.
6. Conclusion
When operating cash ﬂows depend on current economic conditions, ﬁrms should adjust
their policy choices to economy’s business cycle phase. While this basic point has already
been recognized, its implications have not been fully developed. In this paper, we present a
contingent claims model of the levered ﬁrm, where operating cash ﬂows depend on the
realization of both an idiosyncratic and an aggregate shock (that reﬂects the state of the
economy). With this model, we show that:
(1) When the aggregate shock can shift between different states, shareholders’ optimal
default policy is characterized by a different threshold for each state and default




0.001 0.005 0.01 0.015
Dynamic Firm value 13.35 13.30 13.25 13.20
model Leverage 25.96 27.70 28.37 28.51
Coupon 0.248 0.262 0.264 0.265
xU
H 1.43 1.87 2.25 2.59
xU
L 1.49 1.96 2.35 2.70
xD
H 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.17
xD
L 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
Static Firm value 13.07 13.06 13.04 13.01
model Leverage 36.24 35.64 34.87 34.06
Credit spreads 162 159 154 150
xU
H NA NA NA NA
xU
L NA NA NA NA
xD
H 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14
xD
L 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20
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each state reﬂects the possibility for the ﬁrm to default in the other states.
(2) Under this policy, default can be triggered either because the idiosyncratic shock has
reached the default threshold in a given regime or because of a change in the value of
the aggregate shock. As we argue in the paper, the ﬁrst type of default-triggering event
is unlikely to explain the clustering of exit decisions observed in many markets. By
contrast, the second type provides a rationale for such phenomena.
(3) The leverage ratios that the model generates are in line with the leverage ratios
observed in practice. In addition, the model predicts that market leverage
should be countercyclical, consistent with the evidence reported by Korajczyk and
Levy (2003).
(4) The credit spreads generated by the model are in line with those observed in practice.
For any given debt level, credit spreads are higher in a recession than in a boom. The
change in credit spreads following a change in the value of the aggregate shock can be
substantial, reaching up to 120 basis points for ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms. In addition,
the term structure of credit spreads produced by the model encompasses potentially
substantial short term credit spreads.
(5) As Shleifer and Vishny (1992) conjecture, the ﬁrm’s debt capacity depends on current
economic conditions. Firms typically will be able to borrow more funds in a boom,
even assuming a constant loss given default. If the recovery rate is procyclical, the debt
capacity of the ﬁrm in a boom can be up to 40% larger than the debt capacity of that
same ﬁrm in a contraction.
(6) When the ﬁrm can adjust its capital structure dynamically, both the pace and the size of
the adjustments depend on current economic conditions. In particular, ﬁrms should
adjust their capital structure more often and by smaller amounts in booms than in
recessions.
While our model generates implications that are consistent with the available empirical
evidence, it also provides a basis for future empirical work. In particular, while there is
some evidence that ﬁrms ﬁnancing decisions are regime dependent, there is relatively little
work on the pace and size of capital structure changes across business cycle regimes.
Huang and Ritter (2004) ﬁnd using CRSP and Compustat data that ‘‘real GDP growth is
positively associated with the likelihood of debt issuance, but is not reliably related to the
likelihood of equity issuance.’’ Drobetz and Wanzenried (2004) provide a direct test of our
predictions on the pace of capital structure changes on a sample of 91 Swiss ﬁrms.
Consistent with our hypothesis, they ﬁnd that macroeconomic conditions affect the speed
of adjustment to target leverage. In particular, the speed of adjustment is higher when the
term spread is higher, i.e., when economic prospects are good. Finally, de Haas and Peeters
(2004) also ﬁnd that ‘‘higher GDP growth increases the adjustment speed [to target capital
structure] in Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria.’’ More generally, empirical work on this
topic using larger data sets is called for. We leave this issue for future research.
Appendix A. Finite maturity debt value
To solve the system of ODEs (12)–(13), deﬁne the following functions: g   dH   dL
and h   lLdH þ lHdL. We then have the following system of equations on the
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L:









00ðxÞþð lL þ lHÞðc þ mpÞ. (A.2)





þð lL þ lHÞðc þ mpÞ=ðr þ mÞ, ðA:4Þ
where g and g0 are the negative and positive roots of the quadratic equation
r þ m þ lL þ lH   mg  
s2
2
gðg   1Þ¼0, (A.5)
x and x
0
are the negative and positive roots of the quadratic equation
r þ m   mx  
s2
2
xðx   1Þ¼0, (A.6)
and G1, G2, H1, and H2 are constant parameters. The linear growth conditions
lim
x"1
x 1gðxÞo1 and lim
x"1
x 1hðxÞo1 (A.7)





h   lLg
lH þ lL
. (A.8)
Rearranging gives the desired expressions for debt value.
Appendix B. Default policy when m ¼ 0
When m ¼ 0, by Propositions 1 to 3, the value of equity satisﬁes















b1 þ Dxb2 þð 1   tÞ
xyH
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and D are given by
A ¼
ð1   tÞð g   1ÞKLx 








ð1   tÞð x   1ÞKLx 








ð1   tÞð b2   1Þ
x 
HyH









ð1   tÞð b1   1Þ
x 
HyH





ðb2   b1Þðx 
HÞ
b2 . ðB:6Þ
Deﬁning R   x 
L=x 
H and plugging the above expressions for A; B; C; and D into the
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ðb2 1ÞRb1 ðb1 1ÞRb2
b1 b2 ðÞ




















ðxi gÞ þ RKH  
yH
r mþlH R þ
b1ðb2 1ÞRb1 b2ðb1 1ÞRb2
b1 b2
   . (B.10)
Appendix C. Dynamic capital structure
In this section we allow the ﬁrm to adjust its capital structure upwards. We assume that
in the case of a restructuring, the debt is called at par: DiðxU
i ;cÞ¼Pi. Under this
assumption, the value of corporate debt satisﬁes the set of ODEs:








LðxÞþlL½PH   DLðxÞ  þ c. (C.1)
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HðxÞþlH½DLðxÞ DHðxÞ  þ c. ðC:3Þ








HðxÞþlH½aLALðxÞ DHðxÞ  þ c. (C.4)
The boundary conditions associated with this system of equations are given by
DiðxU
i Þ¼Pi; i ¼ L;H, ðC:5Þ
DiðxD
i Þ¼aiAiðxD

































Similarly, tax beneﬁts are akin to a security (1) that pays a constant coupon tc as long as
the ﬁrm is solvent and (2) whose value is scaled by a factor ri in regime i at the time of the
restructuring. Thus, tax beneﬁts satisfy the system of ODEs:








LðxÞþlL½rHTBHðx0Þ TBLðxÞ  þ tc. (C.11)














HðxÞþlH½TBLðxÞ TBHðxÞ  þ tc. ðC:13Þ
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TBiðxU
i Þ¼riTBiðx0Þ; i ¼ L;H, ðC:15Þ
TBiðxD

































Expected bankruptcy costs are akin to a security whose only payoff is ð1   aÞAiðxÞ at the
time of default. Thus, this security satisﬁes the system of ODEs:










LðxÞþlL½rHBCHðx0Þ BCLðxÞ . (C.21)
















HðxÞþlH½BCLðxÞ BCHðxÞ . ðC:23Þ








HðxÞþlH½ð1   aLÞALðxÞ BCHðxÞ . (C.24)
The boundary conditions associated with this system of equations are given by
BCiðxU
i Þ¼riBCiðx0Þ; i ¼ L;H, ðC:25Þ
BCiðxD

































Finally, we assume that the ﬁrm bears proportional issuance costs i when ﬂoating
corporate debt. We denote the present value of these costs exclusive of the initial issuance
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LðxÞþlL½rHðICHðx0ÞþiPHÞ ICðxÞ . (C.31)














HðxÞþlH½ICLðxÞ ICHðxÞ . ðC:33Þ











The boundary conditions associated with this system of equations are given by
ICiðxU
i Þ¼riðICiðx0ÞþiPiÞ; i ¼ L;H, ðC:35Þ
ICiðxD

































A complete solution to the above ODEs is available from the authors upon request.
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